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I. INTRODUCTION 
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is a creation of the federal courts. Prior to 
the first federal case espousing the doctrine, the concept that a plaintiff could 
be incapable of being libeled did not appear in state law. Thus, if the doctrine 
is valid, it must have a sufficient basis in applicable federal law. This paper will 
explore the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and examine it in light of traditional 
standing and jurisdictional principles. Part II of this paper discusses the origin 
of the libel-proof doctrine and its application. Part III explores the general 
requirements for diversity actions in the federal district courts, the application 
of state law to those actions, and the impact of the First Amendment on state 
libel law. Part IV discusses standing to sue principles and analyzes the 
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libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in light of those principles. Part V discusses some 
criticisms of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. Finally, Part VI concludes that 
because the doctrine is not defensible on either standing or jurisdictional 
grounds, it is probably best to dispose of individual claims using traditional 
principles where available, rather than branding a particular plaintiff as 
incapable of being libeled as a matter of law. 
II. ORIGINS AND CONTOURS OF THE LIBEL-PROOF PLAINTIFF DOCTRINE 
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine appears to be an amalgamation of theories 
drawn from several different areas of law. Various federal courts have used the 
doctrine to dismiss libel suits brought under diversity jurisdiction.2 The 
doctrine has evolved into two separate branches. The issue-specific branch 
states that an individual plaintiff is incapable of being libeled with respect to 
one or more issues because his reputation has already been damaged by the 
prior dissemination of similar information. The incremental harm branch looks 
at allegedly libelous statements within the context of an entire publication) If 
the effect of nonactionable statements outweighs the damage done by the 
challenged statements, then the action is dismissed on the basis that the 
challenged statements could not have done the plaintiff any further harm. 
A. The Issue-Specific Branch 
The libel-proof doctrine had its genesis in the Second Circuit decision, 
Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., Inc.4 In Cardillo, the plaintiff, an inmate who was 
then incarcerated in a federal penitentiary, sued the publishers of a book 
entitled, My Life in the Mafia, claiming the book was libelous.5 The book detailed 
Cardillo's alleged involvement in a number of crimes.6 One of the authors was 
said to be a high-ranking organized crime figure who became a Government 
witness and whose testimony helped to convict over twenty people, including 
the plaintiff? The district court dismissed Cardillo's complaint and granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the publication 
was protected by the First AmendmentS On appeal, Cardillo argued that the 
court erred in granting the summary judgment motion because there were 
disputed issues of fact relating to whether the statements were privileged.9 
2Diversity Jurisdiction is provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). 
3See James A. Hemphill, Note: Libel-Proof Plaintiffs and the Question of Injury, 71 TEX. 
L. REv. 401,405-06 (1992). 
4Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
5Jd. at 639. 
6Jd. at 640. 
7Jd. at 639. 
8Jd. 
9Cardillo, 518 F.2d at 638. 
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Judge Oakes, writing for the panel in a three page opinion, summarily disposed 
of this argument, stating, "[W]e consider as a matter of law that appellant is, 
for purposes of this case, libel-proof, i.e., so unlikely to be able to recover 
anything but nominal damages as to warrant dismissal of the case, involving 
as it does First Amendment considerations."lO The opinion then went on to note 
that Cardillo was presently serving a twenty-one year sentence for "assorted 
federal felonies" and had previously been convicted of "numerous minor 
infractions of the law in Massachusetts where he lived."ll Judge Oakes 
concluded by stating that he could not "envisage any jury awarding, or court 
sustaining, an award under any circumstances for more than a few cents' 
damages, even if Cardillo were to prevail on the difficult legal issues with 
which he would be faced."12 
In his short statement that the plaintiff was libel-proof, Judge Oakes created 
a new legal doctrine which has been the subject of numerous debates and has 
been expanded to uses past libel to analogous claims, such as product 
disparagement. The libel-proof doctrine apparently emerged as a product of 
the interplay among the three cases Judge Oakes cites as support for his 
statement: Urbano v. Sondern,l3 Mattheis v. Hoyt,l4 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc. IS 
In Urbano, the plaintiff, a convicted murderer, filed a number of libel actions 
against various parties for statements relating to a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (hereinafter FBI) press release describing Urbano's criminal 
career.l6 Urbano sought leave to proceed in forma pauperisl7 to bring a prose 
claim for libel.IB After allowing the plaintiff some leeway to "amplify and 
clarify" his claims, the court ultimately dismissed the claims as frivolous.19 In 
his opinion, Judge Zampano made it clear that the plaintiff's ability to succeed 
in his claims under Connecticut libel law was "virtually nonexistent" because 
of his inability to show damages or overcome two affirmative defenses.20 
lOJd. 
11 Id. at 640. 
l2Jd. 
13Urbano v. Sondem,41 F.R.D. 355 (D. Conn. 1966), affd 370 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1966). 
14Mattheis v. Hoyt, 136 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Mich. 1955). 
15Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
16Urbano, 370 F.2d at 13; see also 41 F.R.D. 355,356 (listing the "rash of suits" filed by 
Urbano). 
17Urbano sought leave to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 
18 Urbano, 41 F.R.D. at 356. This memorandum opinion also disposed of a companion 
case in which Urbano claimed that FBI agents conspired to libel him in violation of his 
civil rights. Id. 
19 Id. at 357-58. 
20Jd. at 357. 
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Mattheis was similarly a libel suit by an inmate seeking leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis under section 1915(a) of the United States Code,21 and was 
referenced by the Urbano court in its discussion of the factors that deterrninine 
whether a suit should be dismissed as frivolous.22 The plaintiff brought a claim 
for civil rights violations seeking damages under provisions of federal law 
which had no application to his case.23 The court construed his complaint to 
state a libel claim under Michigan law and civil rights claims under sections 
1983 and 1985(3) of title 42 of the United States Code.24 Mattheis had been 
convicted of murder and was serving a life sentence without parole.25 His libel 
claim was based upon an allegedly false report that he had confessed to the 
crime.26 The court stated that the challenged statements were not libelous 
under Michigan law and that neither the Constitution nor federal law protected 
the plaintiff against publication of his picture and an accompanying article 
about the crime.27Therefore, the court denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 
concluding that his action was wholly without merit, frivolous, and 
malicious.28 
In Gertz, the attorney for the family of a murder victim brought a libel suit 
for an article which stated that the attorney was responsible for the "frame-up" 
of the murder defendant, a Chicago police officer, as part of a Communist 
conspiracy to discredit the local police.29 The United States Supreme Court held 
that the attorney was not a public figure and that the publisher could not claim 
a First Amendment privilege simply because the statements concerned an issue 
of public interest.30 
Judge Oakes in Cardillo cited to a secondary holding in the Gertz case: in 
public figure libel cases, "States may not permit the recovery of presumed or 
punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."31 
In Cardillo Judge Oakes faced a case factually analogous to Urbano and 
Matheis. However, Cardillo was neither proceeding pro se nor seeking leave to 
21Mattheis, 136 F. Supp. at 121. 
22See, Urbano 41 F.R.D. at 358. 
23Mattheis, 136 F. Supp. at 121. 
24Jd. 
25Jd. at 123-24. 
26 Id. at 124. 
27Mattheis, 136 F. Supp. at 124. 
28Jd. 
29Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323. 
30 Id. at 339-48. 
31Jd. at 349. 
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proceed in forma pauperis. Indeed, he was represented by competent counsel.32 
Oakes stated in his opinion that the court need not explore how Gertz may have 
affected New York libel law, but curiously he cited to Gertz for a proposition 
supporting his libel-proof doctrine.33 
The following year in Buckley v. Littell,34 Judge Oakes reexamined his opinion 
in Cardillo. The plaintiff, William F. Buckley, sued the defendant for allegedly 
libelous statements in the defendant's book.35 One of the defenses was that 
Buckley was libel-proof.36 This defense was quickly rejected because "[t]he 
doctrine of 'libel-proof' defendants that [the] Cardillo case enunciated is a 
limited, narrow one, which we will leave confined to its basic factual context. "37 
Despite Judge Oakes's effort to close the Pandora's Box opened in Cardillo 
by limiting that case to its "basic factual context,"38 he was too late. Other 
circuits readily adopted the doctrine to dispose of cases on their dockets. For 
example, the Sixth Circuit labeled a plaintiff who sued Geraldo Rivera as 
libel-proof partly because of the plaintiff's past criminal activities.39 The Third 
Circuit recognized the existence of the doctrine in Marcone v. Penthouse 
International Magazine for Men,40 but refused to hold the plaintiff there 
libel-proof.41 
B. The Incremental Harm Branch 
The incremental harm branch grew from the recognition that some libel 
plaintiffs have suffered harm to their reputations which was not caused by the 
alleged libel.42 The analysis focuses on the nonactionable statements in the 
challenged publication.43 "Nonactionable" includes those statements both 
which are true or which, although false, are privileged because either they do 
32Cardillo, 518 F.2d at 638. Cardillo was represented by Maurice N. Nessen of New 
York. Id. 
33Jd. at 639. 
34Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2nd Cir. 1976). 
35The allegedly libelous statements are somewhat lengthy. In sum, the statements 
accuse Buckley of misquoting others in his publications and never apologizing to his 
"victims." Id. at 884 n.l. 
36Jd. at 888-89. 
37Jd. at 889. 
38Jd. 
39See Brooks v. American Broad. Co., 932 F.2d 495 (6th Cir.1991). 
40Marcone v. Penthouse lnt'l, 754 F.2d 1072 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
41Jd. at 1079. 
42See Hemphill, supra note 3, at 405-06. 
43 Id. at 406. 
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not rise to the level of "actual malice"44 or otherwise.45 If the statement 
challenged as libelous causes far less harm to the plaintiff's reputation than the 
nonactionable portions of the publication, the doctrine may be invoked to 
dismiss the claim.46 
The federal district court for the Southern District of New York first 
articulated the incremental harm branch in Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers 
Union of the United States, Inc.47 There, the plaintiff sued over an unfavorable 
review of its new electric car in an issue of Consumer's Digest .48 The challenged 
portion of the publication was the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's 
vehicle failed to meet certain federal safety standards.49 The standards which 
the car reportedly did not meet were actually inapplicable to the car. SO The court 
held that the actionable portions of the article could not harm the plaintiff's 
reputation more than the nonactionable portions of the article had already 
harmed it.51 
Curiously, the Second Circuit again began to champion the libel-proof 
doctrine, but this time through the incremental harm branch. A decade after 
Judge Oakes attempted to limit the doctrine's application, Judge Kaufman, 
who participated in both the Cardillo and Buckley decisions, wrote the court's 
opinion in Herbert v. Lando.52 In Herbert, the plaintiff, a controversial army 
officer during the Vietnam War, sued over allegedly libelous statements made 
by news reporter Mike Wallace during a segment of the television program 60 
Minutes.53 This litigation spanned the course of a decade, reaching the Second 
Circuit twice and the Supreme Court once.54 While purporting not to be 
applying the incremental harm branch, Judge Kaufman conceded in a footnote 
that "[s]ome may view our holding today as a variation of the 'libel-proof' 
doctrine, but we need not so characterize it."55 Judge Kaufman then not only 
44See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution requires that "actual malice" be proved in certain libel cases. 
I d. 
45Hemphill, supra note 3. Statements may be privileged under state law doctrines as 
well as because of First Amendment principles. See Masson, 501 U.S. at 510. 
46Hemphill, supra note 3. 
47Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
48Jd. at 744. 
49 Id. at 744-45. 
50Jd. 
51 Id. at 750. 
52 Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2nd Cir. 1986). 
53 Id. at 302. 
54Jd. 
55 Id. at 311 n.lO. 
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affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment for the 
defendants, he reversed the denial of summary judgment on the remaining 
challenged statements. 56 He also instructed the district court to dismiss the case 
on remand because although the challenged statements, and the implications 
drawn from them, were defamatory, they were not actionable.57 
The incremental harm branch spread in its application much like the 
issue-specific branch. The federal district court in Massachusetts recognized 
the concept in another product disparagement case involving an unfavorable 
Consumer's Digest article, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.58 
An Illinois federal court applied the doctrine to dismiss a business defamation 
claim in Desnick v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.59 In California, a federal district court, 
citing Herbert, applied the incremental harm branch to dismiss a suit by 
Engelbert Humperdinck against the National Enquirer for a story entitled 
"Engelbert Has AIDS Virus."60 
III. DIVERSITY ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
The Constitution states that the judicial power of the federal courts extends 
to all cases and controversies between citizens of different states.61 The "case 
or controversy" requirement defines for the Judicial Branch the idea of 
separation of powers upon which our Federal Government is founded.62 
Within constitutional limits, Congress may control which types of cases the 
federal courts may hear by defining the jurisdiction of the federal courts.63 The 
assertion that Congress has broad authority to regulate federal courts' 
jurisdiction has never been challenged.64 Rather, the Supreme Court has held 
56Jd. at 312. 
57Jd. 
58 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,529 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1981) (recognizing the 
doctrine, but finding it inapplicable in this case). 
59Desnick v. Capital Cities/ ABC, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
60Dorsey v. National Enquirer, 973 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1992). Sadly, this is not an 
appropriate case for me to decry the fact that supermarket tabloids get to cloak 
themselves with First Amendment respectability, because the story itself truthfully 
reports that this allegation was made in court filings by a woman who had successfully 
brought a paternity action against Humperdinck and was now requesting further 
financial support for her and her daughter because of her fear for Humperdinck's health. 
I d. 
61 U.S. CONST. art. III§ 2. 
62Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,471-76 (1982). 
63Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236,245 (1845). 
64CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 36 (4th ed. 1983). 
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that in order for the district courts to be able to hear a particular type of case, 
there must be a specific statute conferring jurisdiction.65 
For diversity actions, Congress has provided such a statute.66 Section 1332 
of the Judiciary Act grants the federal district courts original jurisdiction "of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs," and where the case involves citizens 
of different states.67 The requirement that citizens must be of different states 
has been interpreted to require "complete diversity."68 None of the plaintiffs 
may be domiciled in the same state as any of the defendants.69 As long as 
complete diversity exists at the time the action is brought, the district court may 
hear and adjudicate the case?O 
A. Application of State Law in Diversity Cases 
Federal district courts are required by the Rules of Decision Act (hereinafter 
RDA) to apply "[t]he laws of the several states ... as rules of decision in civil 
actions ... in cases where they apply."71 Early judicial interpretations of this 
statute's predecessors held that the Act merely required the federal courts to 
apply state statutory law where applicable72 However, this interpretation was 
later criticized by Justice Holmes stating, "[I]n my opinion the prevailing 
doctrine has been accepted upon a subtle fallacy that never has been analyzed. 
If I am right the fallacy has resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of 
powers by the Courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable 
array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."73 After almost a full 
century since deciding Swift,74 the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins75 reinterpreted the RDA, holding that the Act required federal courts 
to apply the decisional law of the state courts, as well as state statutes except 
65"Courts created by statute [i.e., the district courts] can have no such jurisdiction 
such as the statute confers." Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441,445 (1850). 
66See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996). 
6728 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 
68See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1, 1664 (3d ed. 1988). The complete diversity rule was first enunciated 
by Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch. 267 (1806). 
69[d. 
70See BATOR, supra note 68 at 1662. 
7128 u.s.c. § 1652 (1996). 
72See Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842). 
73Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) 
(Holmes, dissenting). 
74Swift, 16 Pet. 1. 
75Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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where the United States Constitution or a federal statute preempting state law 
required otherwise?6 This is the rule as it stands today. 
B. The State Law of Libel and First Amendment Concerns 
Libel has traditionally been a state law tort claim. "Libel consists of the 
publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its 
embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communication that has 
the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words."77 
The communication may be deemed defamatory "if it tends to so harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to 
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."78 Generally, to 
succeed in an action for libel, plaintiffs must prove three elements: (1) that the 
communication in question was defamatory; (2) that the defamation was 
published to a third party; and (3) that the plaintiff was identified to a third 
party, but not necessarily by name.79 
The common law recognizes a tort of defamation which encompasses both 
libel and slander to compensate an injured party for damage to his reputation. SO 
In some states, following English common law, libel is actionable per se without 
any proof of injury to reputation or other harm.Sl The concept of libel per se 
recognizes that some statements are "virtually certain" to cause damage and 
that injury to reputation is often difficult to prove.82 In modern libel law, the 
United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that states have a 
legitimate interest in allowing libel plaintiffs to be compensated for the actual 
injury they suffer due to the publication of defamatory material.83 "Actual 
injury" is defined as damage to reputation.84 
In 1964, the Supreme Court recognized the application of constitutional 
concerns to many state law libel actions.85 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the 
Court stated that the law of libel "can claim no talismanic immunity from 
constitutional limitations."86 The Court, in order to preserve robust public 
76Jd. 
77RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 568(a) (1977). 
78Jd. § 559. 
79See DoN R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 1,147 (2d ed. 1981). 
80See generally, David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and Proof, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 747 (1984). 
81W. KEETON ETAL., PROSSERANDKEETONONTHE LAW OF TORTS 1, 771 (5thed.1984). 
82See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,262 (1978). 
83See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341. 
B4See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967). 
85See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
86Jd. at 269. 
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debate through the media, recognized that a certain number of publication 
errors were inevitable.87 To preserve this debate, the Court held that a public 
official bringing a libel claim must prove that a statement in issue was made 
with "actual malice," defined as either actual knowledge that the statement is 
false or reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.BB Further, the Court held that 
the First Amendment requires that actual malice must be proven with 
convincing clarity.89 
Since Sullivan, the Court has struggled to balance libel plaintiffs' interests 
with the First Amendment guarantee of a free press.90 In Curtis Publishing Co. 
v. Butts, the actual malice standard for public officials was extended to those 
who were "public figures."91 The Court reasoned that public figures play an 
important role in influencing society and usually have access to the media 
which enables them to correct false statements.92 Later decisions clarified that 
"[m]ere negligence does not suffice."93 Public figure libel plaintiffs must show 
that the author of the challenged statement either acted with "a high degree of 
awareness of [the statement's] probable falsity,"94 or "in fact entertained serious 
doubts as to the truth of his publication."95 Modem libel law has become a 
search for the proper balance between the rights of libel plaintiffs and First 
Amendment values.96 Since Sullivan, the Court has recognized that 
occasionally the common law must yield to the Constitution.97 Thus, the First 
Amendment now significantly limits state libellaw.98 
IV. STANDING TO SUE AND TIIE LmEL-PROOF PLAINTIFF DOCTRINE 
The law of standing is a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction, the 
solution of whose problems is in any event more or less determined by the 
specific circumstances of individual situations .... "99 Standing is almost 
87Jd. at 271-72. 
BB[d. at 279-80. 
89 Id. at 285-86. 
90See Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1909, 1914 (1985). 
91Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.131 (1%7). 
92Jd. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
93Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991). 
94Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,74 (1964). 
95St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
96See Note, Libel-proofPlaintiffs-Rabble Without a Cause,67B.U.L. REv. 993,995 (1987). 
97 See Note, supra note 90, at 1916. As relevant to this paper, these occasions are when, 
in the absence of actual malice, public officials or public figures are the libel plaintiffs. 
98See Masson, 501 U.S. at 510 (noting that "[t]he First Amendment limits California's 
libel law in various respects"). 
99United States ex rei. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). 
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exclusively concerned with public law questions such as constitutional 
determinations and the review of administrative or other governmental 
actions.lOO Of the judicially created doctrines designed to ensure that courts 
remain in a properly limited role in our society, the requirement that a litigant 
have standing to invoke the power of a federal court is possibly the most 
important,lOl "In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is 
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular 
issues." 102 
A. Injury in Fact 
Cases have long accepted the principle that Article III of the Constitution 
requires the plaintiff to show he was injured by the conduct he challenges,l03 
In Sierra Club v. Morton,104 the plaintiff claimed that the U.S. Forest Service's 
approval of a ski resort violated federal statutes and regulations,lOS The club 
sought standing by claiming it was a party "adversely affected or aggrieved" 
as defined by section ten of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), thus 
entitled to judicial review of the Forest Service's action.106 In its decision 
holding that the club lacked standing to sue because it had not alleged an injury, 
the court stated that the "injury in fact" test requires more than an injury to a 
cognizable interest.107 The injury requirement is a "rough attempt to put the 
decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have a 
direct stake in the outcome."lOB This attempt would be seriously frustrated if 
litigants were granted standing to sue under the APA simply to "vindicate their 
own value preferences through the judicial process."109 
In libel cases, injury is defined as damage to one's reputation,llO Where a 
plaintiff alleges he has been libeled, he is implicitly stating that his reputation 
has been damaged by the publication of defamatory statements of another. As 
previously discussed, such an allegation, even if true, does not guarantee 
recovery.lll It would seem however that the allegation should ensure the 
100See WRIGHT, supra note 64, at 60. 
101Jd. 
102Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975). 
103See WRIGHT, supra note 64, at 123. 
104Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
105Jd. 
1065 u.s.c. § 702 (1988). 
107Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734. 
108Jd. at 735. 
109 I d. at 740. 
110See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967). 
111See supra Part lll.A-B. 
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plaintiff has sufficient injury to meet this prong of the test for standing. The 
allegation seems to do this, but in libel-proof cases, it obtains only enough 
judicial scrutiny to see that the claim is dismissed on summary judgment.112 
The issue-specific branch of the libel-proof doctrine appears to fit well within 
the injury in fact prong. Only a few lower courts have suggested that a plaintiff 
may be libel-proof on any subject.l13 Most courts instead have held that 
plaintiffs with tarnished reputations regarding particular issues may be 
libel-proof with respect to those issues.l14 It has been said that the law of libel 
is concerned with "substantial truth."115 If so, then issue-specific libelous 
statements are not really libelous.l16 If there has been no libel, there has been 
no injury and thus the plaintiff lacks standing to sue. To illustrate this 
contention, take Circuit Judge Scalia's example in his opinion for the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson,ll7 where he 
stated that if it is reported that an individual committed thirty-five robberies 
when the actual number is thirty-four, the statement is likely to be 
nonactionable because the derogatory statement that the individual is an 
habitual burglar is correct and therefore the plaintiff has not been libeled.llB 
The incremental harm branch can be analyzed much the same way. If 
unchallenged or nonactionable statements in a publication cannot further 
damage the plaintiff's reputation,119 again there is no cognizable injury and no 
standing to sue. The injury to the plaintiff's reputation actually was caused by 
statements which were substantially true or privileged under the First 
Amendment.120 
B. Causation 
Article III requires a'" fairly traceable' causal connection between the claimed 
injury and the challenged conduct."121 In libel suits, the chain of causation is 
that the defendant published defamatory material about the plaintiff, thereby 
ll2See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (stating that summary 
judgment for the defendant in public figure libel cases "might well be the rule rather 
than the exception"). 
ll3See supra note 96, at 1910. 
ll4[d. at 1910-11. 
ll5See Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, 800 F.2d 298, 301 (2nd Cir. 1986) (holding the 
plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law both because the statement at issue was 
substantially true and because the plaintiff was libel-proof with respect to the issue). 
ll6[d. 
117Uberty Lobby Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
llB[d. at 1568 n.6. 
ll9See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2nd Cir. 1986). 
l20See, e.g., Marcone v. Penthouse lnt'l, 754 F.2d 1072 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
121Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978). 
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injuring the plaintiff's reputation.122 Defined in this manner, the causation 
chain between the act of publication of defamatory material and the injury to 
the plaintiff's reputation seems fairly traceable. However, when the libel-proof 
doctrine is examined against the causation requirement, we quickly see that 
this is not necessarily the case. 
With the issue-specific branch, a plaintiff is libel-proof where his reputation 
has been "so besmirched as a result of other events at the time of the alleged 
libelous statement, that the plaintiff's reputation would not, by the statement, 
be further damaged .... "123 In this instance, the plaintiff cannot point to any 
libelous statement which has caused damage. "[F]alsehood that would harm 
the reputation of one person may not damage another, especially if the second 
person already has a bad reputation."124 If so, causation may be lacking and 
the plaintiff lacks standing. 
Regarding the incremental harm branch, the analysis is again similar. When 
considered in the context of causation, it seems that because the effect of the 
nonactionable statements on the plaintiff's reputation outweighs the effect of 
the challenged statements, it cannot be said that the nonactionable statements 
have caused harm. In Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 
Inc.,125 the court seemed to be focused on causation when it stated, "the portion 
of the article challenged by plaintiffs could not harm their reputations in any 
way beyond the harm caused by the remainder of the article."126 Thus, if there 
is no causation, there is no standing to bring suit. 
C. Redressability 
Injury in fact and causation themselves are not sufficient to grant standing. 
The plaintiff must also show redressability; that the court, through the relief 
requested, will be able to grant the plaintiff satisfaction for his injury,127 Relief 
from the injury must be likely to follow from a favorable decision.128 While the 
causation requirement examines the relationship between the allegedly 
unlawful conduct and the claimed injury, redressability focuses on the 
connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested.129 
With both the issue-specific and the incremental harm branches, 
redressability does not seem to be a serious problem. Courts typically award 
122See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 568(a) (1977)). 
123Brooks v. American Broad. Co., 737 F. Supp. 431,443 (N.D. Ohio 1990). 
124Hemphill, supra note 3, at 405. 
125Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 516 F Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
126[d. at 750. 
127 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Redress is defined as damages or equitable 
relief. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 885 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991 ). 
128Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,41 (1976). 
129 Allen, 468 U.S. at 474 n.19. 
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successful plaintiffs money damages to compensate for reputational 
injuries.130 That being the case, it seems that any injuries fairly traceable to 
libelous statements are redressable by the court. That is not necessarily so, 
however. A plaintiff who falls within the issue-specific branch cannot maintain 
his suit because his reputation has already been tarnished in regards to that 
subject,l31 If there has been no harm, there is nothing for the court to redress. 
Plaintiffs who fall within the incremental harm branch cannot identify a 
statement which has caused harm beyond that caused by the nonactionable 
statements in the publication.132 Again, without an injury, there can be no 
redress. With either the issue-specific branch or the incremental harm branch, 
without redressability the plaintiff lacks standing to sue. 
V. CRITICISMS OF THE LIBEL-PROOF PLAINTIFF DOCTRINE 
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine appears analogous to traditional standing 
concepts. However, there is one major flaw in attempting to use standing to 
justify the doctrine's existence and continued application: standing is applied 
to federal question claims, not state law claims in federal court by way of 
diversity jurisdiction,l33 To bring a diversity action in a federal district court, 
the plaintiff must merely meet the requirements for invoking the court's 
jqrisdiction, namely diversity of citizenship and the requisite amount in 
controversy.134 If he does so, the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim.l35 
Whether the plaintiff will succeed in his claim is a question controlled by state 
law, whether "declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court."136 
Proving diversity of citizenship is a relatively routine exercise which entails 
simply proving that no plaintiff shares state citizenship with any defendant.137 
130See, e.g., Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 577 F. Supp. 318 (1983) (remitting a jury award 
of $537,500 in punitive damages to $200,000 and leaving undisturbed an award of 
$30,000 in compensatory damages); see also Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, 800 F.2d 298 
(1986) (reversing an award of $1.00 in compensatory damages and $1.6 million in 
punitive damages). 
It has also been suggested that instead of damages, plaintiffs should be able to sue 
for retractions of libelous articles. See Marc A. Franklin, Good Name and Bad lAw: A 
Critique of Libel lAw and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 40-46 (1983). 
131See Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, supra note 96, at 1910. 
132See Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.1986). 
133See Duke Power, 438 U.S. 59, 95 (Stuart, J. dissenting). "Surely there must be some 
direct relationship between the plaintiff's federal claim and the injury relied on for 
standing." I d. The author has been unable to locate any cases where the Court has held 
that a plaintiff lacked standing to bring a state claim in a diversity case. 
134See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996). 
135See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1996); Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842); Black & White Taxicab 
v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab, 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
136Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
137See Wright, supra note 64, at§ 14. 
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As long as diversity exists at the time the suit is commenced, jurisdiction exists 
and will not be defeated by later events.138 Showing that the requisite amount 
in controversy has been met is more difficult. In general, the plaintiff must 
allege a claim which meets the jurisdictional amount requirement.139 "[T]he 
sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good 
faith."140 To show that the jurisdictional amount has not been met, "[i]t must 
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional 
amount to justify dismissa1."141 It does not matter that on the face of the claim 
there may appear a defense to part of the claim.l42 It is the amount claimed 
which controls, and the fact that a defense exists is not sufficient to deprive the 
court of jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the matter.143 
Damages are awarded to libel plaintiffs to compensate them for their 
injuries.144 To the extent that the libel-proof doctrine seems to state that the 
plaintiff cannot meet the requisite amount in controversy requirement to bring 
a diversity case, it seems to rest on jurisdictional grounds. But examined closely, 
these grounds prove illusory. In personal injury diversity actions, federal courts 
have consistently held that damages cannot be dis proven to the legal certainty 
necessary to show that the amount in controversy has not been met and that 
therefore the court lacks jurisdiction.145 Simply because the plaintiff may 
ultimately recover less than the jurisdictional minimum does not mean that the 
court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.146 
It may also be said that the issue-specific branch is merely an extension of 
the substantial truth defense to libel.147 To the extent that the doctrine merely 
mislabels the substantial truth defense, it is defensible. However, the 
issue-specific branch goes further. It states that the plaintiff is incapable of being 
libeled.l48 Some states have retained the theory that a statement can be libelous 
per se.149 In these jurisdictions, the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages 
138Jd. at§ 28. 
139[d. at § 33. 
140St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,288 (1938). 
141Jd. (emphasis added). 
142Schunk v. Moline, Milburn & Stoddart Co., 147 U.S. 500 (1892). 
143See Wright, supra note 64, at§ 33. 
144See Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARV. L. REv. at 1914-15. 
145See Carlough v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
146See WRIGHT, supra note 64, at§ 33. 
147 See Guccione, 800 F.2d at 303 (finding the plaintiff libel-proofbecausethe statements 
alleged libelous were substantially true). 
148See Brooks v. American Broad. Co., 932 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1991). 
149See Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1079-80 (applying Pennsylvania law). 
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despite the statement's substantial truth)SO However, federal courts, by 
applying the issue-specific branch of the doctrine, have denied plaintiffs even 
nominal damages and also the punitive damages that sometimes accompany 
them.151 
The issue-specific branch seems grounded in the proposition that the 
allegedly libelous statements already have been widely disseminated)52 Judge 
Scalia's opinion for a unanimous panel of the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals in Liberty Lobby v. Anderson,153 dismisses this argument by stating that, 
"10,000 repetitions are [not] as good as the truth." Scalia noted that he could not 
"envision how a court would go about determining that someone's reputation 
had already been 'irreparably' damaged - i.e., that no new reader could be 
reached by the freshest libel."154 He also stated that the rule does not further 
any significant First Amendment values.155 
Scalia similarly attacked the incremental harm branch of the doctrine stating 
that at least in public figure cases, unchallenged portions of a publication are 
not necessarily unchallenged because they are true.l56 It may also be the case 
that the plaintiff simply cannot prove that the statements were willfully false 
or made with reckless disregard to their truth or falsity.157 
In any event, the theory must be rejected because it rests upon the 
assumption that one's reputation is a monolith, which stands or falls 
in its entirety. The law, however, proceeds upon the optimistic premise 
that there is a little bit of good in all of us - or perhaps upon the 
pessimistic assumJ?;tion that no matter how bad someone is, he can 
always be worse.1 
If the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is not defensible on any of these grounds, 
then what exactly is the doctrine? There are two things the doctrine is not: it is 
not a part of state law159 nor is it part of First Amendment doctrine.l60 Once 
150See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 255.17 (McKinney 1980). 
151See Guccione, 800 F.2d at 299 (reversing judgments of $1.00 compensatory and $1.6 
million punitive damages). 
152Wynberg v. National Enquirer, 564 F. Supp. 924,928 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
153Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
154Jd. at 1568. 
155Jd. 
156Jd. 
157Jd. 
158Uberty wbby, 764 F.2d at 1568. 
159 Id. at 1568-69 (categorizing the libel-proof cases as "decisions of federal courts 
interpreting state law in the absence of state law guidance"). 
160Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 523 (1991) (rejecting specifically 
the contention that the incremental harm branch is compelled by First Amendment 
doctrine); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1569. "Because we think it a 
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these contentions are disposed of, we are left with what looks like what was 
decried in Erie and its progeny: an impermissible species of federal common 
law, bound to encourage forum-shopping among litigants,l61 
Justice Brandeis stated that there is no federal general common law available 
from which federal judges can draw to decide state law claims,l62 Federal 
courts, sitting in diversity actions, should reach the same results as if a state 
court had heard the case.163 In this way federal and state courts coexist without 
litigants seeking one forum over the other, attempting to manipulate the 
outcomes of their cases.164 The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine has great potential 
to encourage forum shopping and disrupt this coexistence. Public figure 
plaintiffs with besmirched reputations have an incentive to bring their suits in 
state courts for fear that a federal court will declare them libel-proof and thus 
dismiss their suit. Defendants, on the other hand, have a strong incentive to try 
to remove cases filed in state courts to federal courts to have easier access to 
the defense.l65 Both these results are not only undesirable but impermissible. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Federal Courts exercising diversity jurisdiction are bound to apply state 
substantive law. When hearing libel actions, the defendant often has the 
defense of a First Amendment privilege to publish the challenged statements. 
Typically, the trial of such a case involves two principal inquiries: whether the 
defendants have harmed the plaintiff's reputation within the meaning of state 
law, and if so, whether the First Amendment precludes recovery.166 
When answering the first of these questions, federal courts have applied the 
libel-proof plaintiff doctrine to state that the plaintiff is either incapable of being 
libeled on the particular subject matter or that the libelous statements when 
taken in context are incapable of doing any harm beyond that caused by 
non-actionable statements. The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, applied in these 
manners, bears a resemblance to traditional standing doctrine. However, it 
cannot truly be a standing concept because standing is applied to ensure that 
the proper plaintiff is presenting a particular federal claim. In libel-proof 
plaintiff cases, the federal question arises by way of a defense-a First 
Amendment privilege to publish the material. 
fundamentally bad idea, we are not prepared to assume that it is the law of the District 
of Columbia; nor is it part of federal constitutional law." Id. 
l6lSee Erie, 304 U.S. 64. 
162Jd. at 78. 
l63See WRIGHT, supra note 64, at§ 60. 
164Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
165"Any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or defendants to the 
district court of the United States .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). 
l66See Steaks Unlimited v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264,270 (3rd Cir. 1980). 
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When federal courts apply the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in a diversity case 
where state libel law has no such concept, they are engaging in an 
impermissible activity-that of creating a generalized "federal common law" 
which conflicts with state law. This is exactly the sort of activity which 
encourages forum-shopping and was denounced in Erie. In these cases, courts 
need to be clear in their decisions. The analysis summarized by the Third 
Circuit should be adhered to. First, analyze the statements in light of state libel 
law. Only then should the question of First Amendment privilege be addressed. 
In this manner, courts can dispose of nonmeritorious claims, protect First 
Amendment values, and stay true to the proper role of a federal court in a 
diversity action. Because both branches of the libel-proof doctrine interfere 
with this process, the doctrine should be abandoned in its entirety. 
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